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#Image steganography for mac .dll
#Image steganography for mac update
#Image steganography for mac software

Multiple SUNBURST samples have been recovered, delivering different payloads. This section will detail the notable techniques and outline potential opportunities for detection.

This actor prefers to maintain a light malware footprint, instead preferring legitimate credentials and remote access for access into a victim’s environment. After gaining initial access, this group uses a variety of techniques to disguise their operations while they move laterally (Figure 2).

#Image steganography for mac software

We are currently tracking the software supply chain compromise and related post intrusion activity as UNC2452. Post Compromise Activity and Detection Opportunities

FireEye has notified all entities we are aware of being affected. We anticipate there are additional victims in other countries and verticals. The victims have included government, consulting, technology, telecom and extractive entities in North America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Worldwide Victims Across Multiple VerticalsįireEye has detected this activity at multiple entities worldwide. The list of known malicious infrastructure is available on FireEye’s GitHub page. The C2 traffic to the malicious domains is designed to mimic normal SolarWinds API communications. The DNS response will return a CNAME record that points to a Command and Control (C2) domain. After a dormant period of up to two weeks, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloudcom.

#Image steganography for mac update

Once the update is installed, the malicious DLL will be loaded by the legitimate or SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost圆4.exe (depending on system configuration).

#Image steganography for mac .dll

The trojanized update file is a standard Windows Installer Patch file that includes compressed resources associated with the update, including the trojanized .dll component.

hxxps://downloads.solarwindscom/solarwinds/CatalogResources/Core/2019.4/20.20574/SolarWinds-Core-v20-Hotfix5.msp.

Multiple trojanzied updates were digitally signed from March - May 2020 and posted to the SolarWinds updates website, including: The backdoor uses multiple obfuscated blocklists to identify forensic and anti-virus tools running as processes, services, and drivers.įigure 1: SolarWinds digital signature on software with backdoor The malware masquerades its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol and stores reconnaissance results within legitimate plugin configuration files allowing it to blend in with legitimate SolarWinds activity. We are tracking the trojanized version of this SolarWinds Orion plug-in as SUNBURST.Īfter an initial dormant period of up to two weeks, it retrieves and executes commands, called “Jobs”, that include the ability to transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machine, and disable system services. dll is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The campaign is the work of a highly skilled actor and the operation was conducted with significant operational security. Post compromise activity following this supply chain compromise has included lateral movement and data theft. This campaign may have begun as early as Spring 2020 and is currently ongoing.

They gained access to victims via trojanized updates to SolarWind’s Orion IT monitoring and management software. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. FireEye products and services can help customers detect and block this attack.įireEye has uncovered a widespread campaign, that we are tracking as UNC2452. These are found on our public GitHub page. FireEye is releasing signatures to detect this threat actor and supply chain attack in the wild.The campaign is widespread, affecting public and private organizations around the world.The attacker’s post compromise activity leverages multiple techniques to evade detection and obscure their activity, but these efforts also offer some opportunities for detection.

FireEye discovered a supply chain attack trojanizing SolarWinds Orion business software updates in order to distribute malware we call SUNBURST.

We are tracking the actors behind this campaign as UNC2452.

We have discovered a global intrusion campaign.